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Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial
The seventh amendment requires that in "Suits at common
law... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."' Beginning
with Justice Story's 1812 opinion on circuit in United States v.
Wonson,2 the accepted interpretation of the amendment has been
that it guarantees the right to trial by jury in all civil proceedings
that, had they been brought in England in 1791, would have been
tried at common law.3 This "flexible" historical test lent itself to
straightforward application when it was first articulated in the
nineteenth century,4 because litigation of that period bore a close
resemblance to that of the late eighteenth century.5
Application of the test in recent years, however, has not al-
ways been so easy.6 The last fifty years have seen a tremendous
liberalization of civil procedure 7 and an unprecedented prolifera-
tion of new causes of action,8 which together make it possible for
civil litigation to reach a level of complexity exceeding anything
imaginable in the common law courts of 1791. Modern securities
and antitrust cases, for example, can involve an enormous number
of parties and claims, highly technical factual inquiries, tremen-
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The full text of the amendment reads as follows:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law.
2 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
3 See, e.g., Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment: A Commentary
on the Zenith Case, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1571, 1572 (1983).
' See infra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
" For example, Wonson is itself an instance of the ancient common law action of debt
upon a statutory penalty. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. In Wonson, the
"action was debt for a penalty incurred under the 3d section of the embargo supplementary
act, Jan. 9, 1808, c.8 [2 Stat. 453]." 28 F. Cas. at 745.
6 See F. JAxas & G. HAZARD, CIvI PROCEDURE § 8.2 (2d ed. 1977); 5 J. MOORE, J. LucAs
& J. WICKER, MooRe's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 38.08[5] (2d ed. 1982); 9 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2302 (1971).
7The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first adopted in 1938. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
86 (1938), in 308 U.S. 645, 766 (1939).
8 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADIN4ISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
CouRTs 3 (1980) (Table 3: Civil Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending on June 30, 1940-
1980); id. at 61 (Table 19: Civil Cases Commenced in the U.S. District Courts, by Nature of
Suit, During the Twelve Month Periods Ended June 30, 1975-1980).
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dous volumes of documentary evidence, and trials lasting several
years.9 Even when confronted with exceedingly complex litigation,
some courts have refused to foreclose jury trial, holding that com-
plexity is not a constitutionally appropriate ground for denying a
jury.10 Yet other federal courts have denied demands for a jury
trial in complex cases, generally resting their decisions on one of
two grounds: first, that a trial of a such a case to an uncom-
prehending jury would constitute a denial of due process;11 and
second, that such cases are inherently beyond the understanding of
a jury, so that trying them to a jury would constitute an inade-
9 For example, in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. (In re Japanese
Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig.), 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d
Cir. 1980), the district court refused to strike a jury demand despite the fact that "the trial
would last a full year" and that nine years of discovery had produced "millions of docu-
ments and over 100,000 pages of depositions." 631 F.2d at 1073. The suit alleged a conspir-
acy among 24 named defendants, almost 100 other co-conspirators, and the Japanese gov-
ernment to maintain artificially low prices for Japanese electronic products. Id. at 1072-73 &
nn. 1-2. Plaintiffs sought recovery under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982), the
Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-9 (1982), the Antidumping Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982), the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), and the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(b), 21(a) (1982). 631 F.2d at 1072. Some of the defendants counter-
claimed against the plaintiffs and 30 other co-conspirators for violations of the Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982), as well as the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts. 631 F.2d
at 1072-73. In essence, the case required a jury to evaluate the conduct of the entire Japa-
nese electronics industry and its distributors around the world during the late 1960's and
most of the 1970's. The Third Circuit vacated the district court's ruling and held that the
case was too complex for a jury trial. Id. at 1069.
The district court in In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd,
609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980), struck the jury demands on
the grounds that the case was too complex. In that dispute, five classes of plaintiffs were
aligned in 18 consolidated lawsuits against over 100 defendants. Three years of discovery
had produced 150,000 pages of depositions and over 5 million documents. Id. at 707. The
judge estimated that the documents likely to be offered into evidence at trial would be
equivalent to the first 90 volumes of the second series of the Federal Reporter. Id. The trial
was expected to exceed two years, id. at 713-14, and the judge was unsure whether there was
a courtroom large enough to hold all the attorneys, let alone the jurors and alternates, id. at
715. See also Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (65 named
plaintiffs, representing up to 1100 class members, sued 11 defendants for antitrust violations
in connection with 1050 separate contracts); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F.
Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal 1978) (five-month trial involving complex technical and financial issues,
2300 exhibits, and 19,000 pages of transcript, in which the jury, after 19 days of delibera-
tion, declared itself hopelessly deadlocked), aff'd per curiam, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980);
In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (an expected four to six
months of trial, with 900,000 documents produced in discovery, involving complex accounts
relating to over $1 billion in assets and liabilities arising out of over five years of financial
activities).
10 See, e.g., In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 929 (1980).
12 See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. (In re Japanese Elec.
Prods. Antitrust Litig.), 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
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quate remedy at law. In the latter situation, the jurisprudence of
1791 would have required that the case be brought in equity,
where there would have been no jury trial. 2
The question of the propriety of jury trials in complex civil
litigation, and the constitutionality of precluding them, has engen-
dered considerable academic commentary. Lord Devlin has argued
that in 1791 the equity courts of England exercised the power to
prevent especially complex cases from being tried to juries in the
common law courts and that federal courts, in their equity capac-
ity, retain this power under the seventh amendment.' s In response
to Devlin's assertion, Professor Arnold has sought to demonstrate
the absence of such a "complexity" exception. 4
This comment considers the question of the requirements of
22 See, e.g., Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). An in-
adequate remedy at law was the most common justification for the exercise of equity juris-
diction. See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 32 (Boston 1836) ("Perhaps
the most general, if not the most precise, description of a Court of Equity, in the English
and American sense, is, that it has jurisdiction in cases of rights recognised and protected by
the municipal jurisprudence, where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had
in the Courts of Common Law."); Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at
the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 43, 51-53 (1980); Note, The Right
to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARv. L. REv. 898, 900-01 (1979).
13 See Devlin, supra note 12. In a subsequent article, Lord Devlin has bolstered his
argument for the retained equity power of federal courts to foreclose jury trials in complex
cases by analogizing to modern due process jurisprudence. Due process, Devlin argues, has
come to serve a similar function to that served in 1791 by the notion of "lack of equity."
Under either concept, a court is authorized, where strict application of normal procedural
rules would work a notable unfairness on one of the parties, to adjust those rules and mold
ones specially tailored to the peculiar circumstances of the particular case. Devlin, supra
note 3, at 1583-1607. Lord Devlin's first article, in which he concluded that there was a
complexity exception to the right to jury trial at common law, represents research commis-
sioned by IBM for use in its amicus curiae briefs in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. (In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig.), 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980), in In
re U.S. Fin. See. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980), and in IBM's own party brief in ILC Peripherals Leasing
Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.
1980). See Japanese Electronics Prods., 631 F.2d at 1083 (discussion of IBM's role in the
litigation); U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d at 418 n.17 (same); see also Lempert, Civil Juries
and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REv. 68, 74 (1981) ("The
leading arguments in the historical debate have been propounded by people who, however
disinterested their actual scholarship, were employed by one side in a lawsuit and paid-no
doubt handsomely-for reaching the results they did.").
14 See Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil
Litigation, 128 U. P. L. Rv. 829 (1980). Professor Arnold's article is an abridgement of a
monograph produced for the plaintiffs in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
(In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig.), 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). See Arnold,
supra, at 1082 n.12; Lempert, supra note 13, at 74. Professor Arnold examines the same
cases as Lord Devlin (compare Devlin, supra note 12) and concludes that they are "much
too frail" to support a complex case exception to common law jurisdiction. Arnold, supra, at
840.
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the seventh amendment in modern, complex litigation from an-
other perspective. It argues that, in order to understand the scope
of the seventh amendment in such cases, it is necessary to consider
the understanding of the amendment's framers as to the nature of
"Suits at common law." To develop an understanding of the per-
spective of the framers, the comment reviews common law litiga-
tion in the principal English courts during the years 1789 to 1791.
Part I presents a brief overview of the mechanics of English com-
mon law litigation during this period and demonstrates that the
procedural framework limited the role of the jury to deciding a
very few and very simple questions of fact. Part II presents a sta-
tistical survey of the actual litigation of the period, which demon-
strates the simplicity of the cases submitted to common law juries
in contrast to those tried by the court in equity.
Part IlI considers the implications of this evidence both for
Lord Devlin's search for a "complex cases" exception and for the
law as it now stands. It concludes that the common law recognized
no complex case exception because the procedural limits within
which the jury functioned insured that no complex cases would
ever reach the jury. Part HI also concludes that the current exclu-
sive focus on the rights adjudicated or the remedies available in
suits at common law in 1791 is misguided. Although the comment
acknowledges that a comparison of the right asserted and the rem-
edy requested by a modern plaintiff with the rights and remedies
available at common law in 1791 is always significant, and perhaps,
in the usual case, dispositive, it argues that, insofar as modern pro-
cedural reforms allow plaintiffs to bring suits that bear virtually no
resemblance, outside of the right of remedy, to suits at common
law in 1791, it is improper to ignore entirely the effect of those
procedural reforms. The comment argues that a proper analysis of
the scope of the constitutional right to a civil jury trial must in-
clude not only an examination of the nature of the rights asserted
and the remedies requested by the plaintiff, but also an inquiry
into the procedural complexity of a case. The comment concludes
that, under this analysis, an extraordinarily complex case may be
outside the ambit of the seventh amendment.
I. A SURVEY OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF
ENGLISH CIVIL CASES IN 1791
Although the Constitution as adopted in 1789 contained no
provision guaranteeing a right to jury trial in civil, as opposed to
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criminal, 5 cases, the delegates at the constitutional convention had
considered and ultimately rejected such a clause.1" The absence of
such a clause was a frequent source of objection in the state con-
ventions called to ratify the original constitution,17 and, in re-
sponse, the first Congress included the seventh amendment in the
Bill of Rights.18 Although, as Madison noted, the right to a civil
jury trial was "a subject [the people had] much at heart,"'9 and
may well have engendered considerable discussion in Congress
when the seventh amendment was proposed, no record of the con-
gressional debates has been preserved.20 Even the debate on the
similar provision considered at the constitutional convention is no-
tably unilluminating as to the scope of the jury right intended by
that provision's proponents. 1 In light of this dearth of explanation
1 A guarantee of jury trial in criminal cases was included in the original Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2, para. 3.
16 Although the evidence is not conclusive, it appears that the draft of the Constitution
passed from the floor of the Convention to the Committee of Detail and then to the Com-
mittee on Style and Arrangement before the framers considered a jury guarantee for civil
actions. See Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARv. L. REv.
289, 292-95 (1966); Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 656-66 (1973). Delegate Williamson suggested that such a provision be
added, and Delegate Gerry supported the proposal on the grounds that it would provide
protection from corrupt judges. Delegate Gorham objected: "It is not possible to discrimi-
nate equity cases from those in which juries are proper [and the] Representatives of the
people may safely be trusted in this matter." 2 REcoRms OF THE FEDERAL CONVEmION OF
1787, at 587 (M. Farrand ed. 1937). The discussion turned to a proposal for a general bill of
rights, which was overwhelmingly defeated. Several days later, Delegates Pinckney and
Gerry formally moved to have the following language added to the Constitution: "And a
trial by jury shall be preserved as usual in civil cases." Id. at 628. Delegates Gorham and
King, however, objected, stating that different states constituted their juries differently and
used them in different types of actions; the proposed amendment was subsequently rejected.
Id. at 629.
17 See Henderson, supra note 16, at 295-99; Wolfram, supra note 16, at 667-725.
8 See Henderson, supra note 16, at 291-92; Wolfram, supra note 16, at 725-30.
"9 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 444 (J. Gales ed. 1789). Madison made this statement in con-
nection with a proposal that article III of the Constitution be amended by adding at the
end: "But no appeal to such court shall be allowed where the value in controversy shall not
amount to-dollars: nor shall any fact triable by jury, according to the course of common
law, be otherwise re-examinable than may consist with the principles of common law." Id. at
452. Madison also proposed that the third clause of article III, § 2, be replaced, in part, by
the words, "In suits at common law, between man and man, the trial by jury, as one of the
best securities to the rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate." Id. at 453. Madison's
phrase, "between man and man," suggests that he conceived of the typical action for which
jury trial was appropriate as a simple contest between two individuals. Madison's source for
the phrase was probably the declaration of rights adopted by the Virginia convention that
ratified the Constitution. See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 658 (J. Elliot 2d ed. n.p. 1854) (lst ed. Washington
1836).
20 Wolfram, supra note 16, at 729-30.
21 "Although the surviving records of the proceedings of the Philadelphia Convention
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by the amendment's framers, one is forced to rely on an examina-
tion of the context in which the amendment was drafted in order
to discern the likely meaning that the framers attached to the
amendment. Accordingly, this Part presents a brief, general outline
of the procedural and substantive character of cases in the English
common law courts at the time of the amendment's adoption,
while the next Part presents a statistical survey of the cases re-
ported in the major courts of England in the three years preceding
the adoption of the seventh amendment.
Three major common law courts existed in England in 1791:
Exchequer, Common Pleas, and King's Bench.22 The Chancery was
the principal court of equity.23 The development of the various En-
glish courts was not the product of a systematic plan, but rather
the result of a process of institutional evolution that spanned sev-
eral centuries. Each court typically grew out of the administrative
specialization of a group of royal officers that, as it developed in-
creasing expertise and began to act more independently of the
monarch, came to function as a quasi-independent institution.2
Because each court developed at a different time, each adopted sig-
nificantly different procedures.25
One crucial feature shared by all common law courts, however,
was the writ system. A writ was originally a royal order to an indi-
vidual "to redress the wrong he was said to have done" or to ap-
pear before the court and explain to the royal justices why he had
not redressed it.2 6 Later, the defendant was no longer given the
opportunity simply to redress the wrong, and writs came to be the
are sketchy, it is almost certain that altogether not more than an hour or so was spent on
the subject of jury trials." Id. at 660 n.50.
J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL HISTORY 46 (2d ed. 1979). The following dis-
cussion is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of the structure of the English judicial
system, merely an effort to frame the statistical evidence presented in Part H. For a more
comprehensive study of the development of the English judicial system, see 1 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 194-264 (1931). For a discussion of the reform of the court
system beginning in the early nineteenth century, see id. at 633-50.
23 J. BAKER, supra note 22, at 86-89. For descriptions of the lesser courts of equity, see
J. BAKER, supra note 22, at 103-06 (Court of Requests and regional equity courts); W.
BRYSON, THE EQUITY SIDE OF THE EXCHEQUER passim (1975).
24 See T. PLUcKNEmr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 146 (5th ed. 1956); see
also id. at 139-56.
25 1 W. TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH AND COMMON PLEAS, IN
PERSONAL ACTIONS XXXix (6th ed. London 1817) (1st ed. Dublin 1791) (discussion of differ-
ences in "the nature of the process used for bringing in the defendant,. . . the manner in
which [process] is returnable, the times prescribed or allowed for particular purposes, and
the modes of transacting business by the court or its officers").
28 R. VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILLE 244
(1959) (77 Selden Soc'y).
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method for initiating suit in the royal courts.27
The writs were specialized, so that a separate writ existed for
each civil wrong. Each writ corresponded to a separate "form of
action," which was defined according to the specific nature of the
wrong alleged.2 Because the forms of action were defined both
narrowly and precisely, this system severely limited the subject
matter of any single lawsuit. 9 A plaintiff could not merely allege
injury by another; he had to determine the precise nature of the
legal wrong before procuring his writ.30 Presenting one's claims
under the wrong writ or alleging facts inappropriate to the nature
of the writ chosen meant losing the suit." In addition, one writ
2D. STENTON, ENGLISH JUSTICE BETWEEN THE NORMAN CONQUEST AND THE GREAT CHAR-
TER 1066-1215, at 32-33 (1964); R. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 26, at 244-48; see F.
MAITLAND, THE FORMS OP ACTION AT COMMON LAW 21-26 (1948).
'1 See T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 24, at 353-57. By the 1790's a plaintiff could some-
times forego obtaining an original writ and could instead proceed directly to serving process
upon a defendant by capias in Common Pleas or by bill of Middlesex or latitat in King's
Bench. 4 SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH UNDER EDWARD II, at lxxxv (G.
Sayles ed. 1957) (74 Selden Soc'y) ("Apart from the substitution of an originating bill for an
originating writ and the quickening of process, there is no discernible difference from pro-
cess by writ: procedure, pleadings, trial, judgment, punishment, recovery of damages, all
these remain precisely the same."); see also 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *279-92
(chapter "Of Process"); 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 250, 341 (process not by origi-
nal writ); 1 W. TID, supra note 25, at 95-96 (process by capias or bill of Middlesex).
" See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *153-66. For example, certain contractual
claims, such as payment of a bond, would be brought under a writ of debt; others, such as
enforcement of an insurance claim, under a writ of covenant; still others, such as suit on a
mere promise, under a writ of assumpsit. See id.; F. MArrLAND, Seven Lectures on the
Forms of Action, in EQUIrY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 355-58 (1909).
Certain tort claims could only be tried in trespass, whereas others required a writ of trespass
on the case. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *120-27.
3O For an example of the classification of injuries into their proper writs, see 6 G. JACOB,
THE LAW DICTIONARY 288 (New York 1811) (1st ed. London 1729):
It is a settled distinction, that where an act is done which is in itself an immediate
injury to another's person or property, there the remedy is usually by an action of
Trespass vi et armis: But where there is no act done, but there is only a culpable
omission, or where the act is not immediately injurious, but only by consequence and
collaterally, there no action of Trespass vi et armis will lie, but an action on the special
case for the damages consequent on such omission or act.
Similarly, if a plaintiff sought return of his property from another, he had to choose the
proper writ. As Holdsworth explained: "Trespass de bonis asportatis lay for a wrongful tak-
ing of the plaintiff's chattels by the defendant from the plaintiff's possession; detinue lay for
the wrongful detention of the plaintiff's chattels by the defendant; and trover lay for the
wrongful conversion or disposition of the plaintiff's chattels by the defendant." 7 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, supra note 22, at 403.
3, A litigant "may make a bad choice [of writs], fail in his action, and take such comfort
as he can from the hints of the judges that another form of action might have been more
successful." F. MAITLAND, supra note 27, at 4. The harshness of this rule was mitigated by
the availability of procedure by capias or bill of Middlesex. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
28, at *293-94.
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could not be amended into a different writ once an action had be-
gun.3 2 Two writs could not ordinarily be presented in the same
suit, so that a plaintiff could not attempt to strengthen his case by
joining, for example, trespass with case, or trover with detinue33
The general effect of the writ system was to limit the questions in
any particular case to a few related issues of fact or law raised by a
narrowly defined form of action. 4 This limitation made it unlikely
that a case presented to a jury would involve more than a single
transaction among a small number of parties.
Strict rules of pleading further narrowed the scope of the case
presented for jury consideration. According to Blackstone:
Every plea must be simple, intire [sic], connected, and con-
fined to one single point: it must never be entangled with a
variety of distinct independent answers to the same matter;
which must require a many different replies, and introduce a
multitude of issues upon one and the same dispute. For this
would embarrass the jury, and sometimes the court itself, and
at all events would greatly enhance the expense of the
parties.3 5
Another writer of the period described the process in these terms:
"The defendant answers this declaration; and the charge and de-
fence, by due course of pleading, are brought down to one or more
plain simple facts. These facts, arising out of the pleadings, and
thence called issues, come next to be tried by a jury.'" 6 This pro-
cess, called "pleading down to issue," was the most prominent fea-
ture of the common law pleading system and was designed to pre-
vent complex problems from overtaxing a jury.3 7
The law of evidence, well developed by 1791,8 also restricted
the complexity of cases that could be put before a jury. To prove a
2 Although the writ could not be amended, under certain circumstances, a declaration,
plea, or replication could be amended. See 2 W. TIn, supra note 25, at 743-47, 755.
33 See 6 G. JACOB, supra note 30, at 458 ("In all Writs care is to be taken, that they be
laid and formed according to the cause or ground of them, and so pursued in the process
thereof .... ).
See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *311. See also the remark of Lord Kenyon, Chief
Justice of the King's Bench: "the use of pleading is to reduce the matters in litigation to a
single point ...... Douglas v. Patrick, 3 T.R. 683, 684, 100 Eng. Rep. 802, 803 (K.B. 1790)
(emphasis added).
31 W. TWO, supra note 25, at xxxiii.
37 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *311.
38 See 1 J. WIGMoRE, A TREAnS E ON THE ANGLO-AmERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE, § 8, at
238 (3d ed. 1940) (By 1790, the "full spring-tide of the system [of evidence] had now
arrived.").
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deed, for example, a subscribing witness had to be produced in
court, because the law of evidence allowed proof of a person's
handwriting only by the testimony of one who had actually seen
the signing of the instrument.39 Testimonial evidence was severely
limited by competence requirements, strict regulation of the form
of examination, and strict rules for hearsay.40 Because no individ-
ual with an interest in the outcome of a suit was allowed to testify,
the plaintiff and the defendant were never allowed to take the
stand.41
No better indicator exists of the dramatic increase wrought by
modern rules of procedure and evidence in the complexity of mod-
ern civil trials than the increase in their length. In 1791, most trials
were exceedingly brief; a trial lasting more than a day was consid-
ered extraordinary. 42 Usually, the jury's deliberation was equally
speedy:
The jury, after the proofs are summed up, unless the case be
very clear, withdraw from the bar to consider of their verdict:
and, in order to avoid intemperance and causeless delay, are
to be kept without meat, drink, fire, or candle, unless by per-
mission of the judge, till they are all unanimously agreed.43
Today a civil trial may last weeks or even months," and in rare
cases trials have gone on for over a year.
39 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 506.
4' See 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 38, at § 525; 5 id. § 1364.
' See Bodansky, The Abolition of the Party-Witness Disqualification: An Historical
Survey, 70 Ky. L.J. 91 (1981); Devlin, supra note 12, at 58. Disqualification of the testimony
of interested witnesses persisted in the English common law courts until 1843, and the dis-
qualification of the testimony of parties remained the rule until 1851. Bodansky, supra, at
93.
42 Devlin, supra note 12, at 58.
" 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *375.
" See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 448 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (10-months estimated trial), aff'd per curiam, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980); Bernstein
v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (4 months minimum estimate
but probably longer because of interruptions required for criminal matters by Speedy Trial
Act); Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 228 (N.D. IlL
1977) (estimate of "only three weeks"); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99, 104
(W.D. Wash. 1976) (4-6 months estimated trial).
4s See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. (In re Japanese Elec.
Prods. Antitrust Litig.), 478 F. Supp. 889, 897 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (1-year estimated trial), va-
cated, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig, 75 F.R.D. 702, 713 (S.D. Cal.
1977) (2-year estimated trial), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929
(1980).
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III. SuRvEY OF LITIGATION IN THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW COURTS
FROM 1789 TO 1791
The observations in the preceding section concerning the na-
ture of common law litigation would lead one to expect that the
scope of common law suits, and consequently the role of the jury,
was narrowly restricted. In order to test that prediction, this Part
provides a statistical analysis of common law jury practice by ana-
lyzing all of the reported cases in the major English common law
trial courts during the years 1789 to 1791, the period from the rati-
fication of the Constitution to the ratification of the seventh
amendment.46 The purpose of the analysis is to examine the actual
complexity of lawsuits during this period as an aid in ascertaining
the framers' conception of "Suits at common law." The cases are
analyzed in terms of those features that together constitute the
overall complexity of a suit: the number of parties involved; the
amount in controversy; and the nature of the claims. The common
law courts are considered first. Published reports exist for only two
of the three major English common law courts, Common Pleas and
King's Bench, for this period; no reports have been published for
the common law side of the Exchequer. 7 The survey also considers
nisi prius reports of the trial phase of cases in the common law
courts for the years 1790 and 1791. For comparison, the survey also
examines equity litigation during the same period.
The reporters for this period are generally considered to be
highly reliable.48 They do not, however, contain reports of all the
cases brought during the period. Therefore it is probable that an
analysis of the original documents in the English Public Record
Office would yield some variation from the results obtained by ana-
lyzing only the reported cases. Such variations, of course, would
not necessarily call for different conclusions. To the contrary, the
systematic bias inherent in law reporting of the period toward
46 For the King's Bench and Common Pleas reports, discussed infra notes 50-104 and
accompanying text, the period extends from Hilary term, 29 Geo. 3, 1789, to Michaelmas
term, 32 Geo. 3, 1791. For the nisi prius reports, discussed infra notes 105-27 and accompa-
nying text, it extends from after Easter term, 30 Geo. 3, 1790, to after Michaelmas term, 32
Geo. 3, 1791.
47 Cox's Chancery reports, 29-30 Eng. Rep., cover 1783 to 1796 and include some Ex-
chequer equity cases but no common law cases. The common law Exchequer reports nearest
in time to the period examined in this comment appear in Anstruther's reports, 145 Eng.
Rep., for 1792 to 1797. See W. BRYSON, supra note 23, at 199-200. Though primarily a com-
mon law court, the Exchequer also had a limited equitable jurisdiction available to "officers
of the exchequer, royal accountants, and debtors to the crown." Id. at 17.
48 See infra notes 90, 108 and accompanying text.
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cases of interest to the bar is likely to have inflated the average
and median sums in controversy; disputes of a simpler, more rou-
tine nature are less likely to have been included in the published
reports.
Finally, it should be noted that the reports are often not opin-
ions of the court, but the reporter's description of the decisions
derived primarily from the reporter's or the judge's notes.49 While
the thoroughness with which the information is presented varies
with the reporter, and while subtle distinctions may have been lost
in a rendition of this kind, the reports generally include the pri-
mary information necessary for the survey to be undertaken here.
A. The Court of Common Pleas
In Magna Carta, the barons demanded that some royal judges
adjudicate private suits in "some fixed place, '50 rather than, as was
the practice up to that the time, all attending the king wherever he
travelled. The judges that, in compliance with this demand, re-
mained at Westminster became known in later times as the Court
of Common Pleas; the judges that continued to travel with the
king later became the Court of King's Bench, a name that the
court kept even after forsaking its peripetetic ways.51 In the eight-
eenth century the Court of Common Pleas consisted of a chief jus-
tice and three "puisne," or junior, justices.5 2 Most of the available
writs could be presented to Common Pleas, though the court never
developed a criminal jurisdiction.53 It did at one time maintain a
monopoly over the real actions by which seisin of a freehold was
tried,5 but by the eighteenth century the writ of ejectment availa-
4" See, e.g., 1 W. BROWN, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETEMINED IN THE I-GHral
COURT OF CHANCERY preface (4th ed. London 1819) (1st ed. London 1785); T. PEAx, CASES
DETERMINED AT Nisi Pmius, IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH v-vi (3d ed. London 1820) (1st
ed. Dublin 1795).
So MAGNA CARTA C. 17 (1215); see 2 W. STUBBS, THz CONSTrrUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENG-
LAND IN rrs ORIGIN AND DEvELOPmENT § 233 (3d ed. 1880) (discussing the development of the
English judicial system).
51 See 2 W. STUBBS, supra note 50, at § 233.
52 See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *40; see also 6 G. JACOB, supra note 30, at
343 (definition of "puisne"); J. BAKER, supra note 22, at 35; cf. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 28, at *40 n.n.
53See J. BAKER, supra note 22, at 35; T. PLUCKNTT, supra note 24, at 155; see also I
W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 201 (error from justices of the peace lies with King's
Bench).
1. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 198 & n.2.
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ble in King's Bench was the more prevalent means of trying the
right to possession of land.5
Henry Blackstone, the nephew of the better-known William
Blackstone, reported the decisions of the Court of Common Pleas
from 1788 to 1796.56 Blackstone reported 124 cases during the pe-
riod of 1789-1791. 57 Four decisions of the Exchequer Chamber and
one from the House of Lords have been excluded from the statisti-
cal sample because they were not trial-level cases, and three ac-
tions for a writ of prohibition have also been excluded because
they were perogative writs and hence did not involve jury trial,
leaving 116 Common Pleas cases to be considered here.
1. Parties. A tabulation of the number of parties in these cases
reveals the following pattern:5 8
Table 1
No. of Parties No. of Cases
2 76 (65.5%)
3 18 (15.5%)
4 or more 22 (19.0%)
The typical case in Common Pleas involved only a single
plaintiff suing a single defendant. Most of the multiple-party liti-
gation involved a single plaintiff suing a small group; multiple par-
ties were present on both sides in only seven percent of the cases.
The category "four or more" parties is used because many of the
cases indicate only that "others" were involved. 9 One should not
assume, however, that large numbers of parties were joined. Of the
eight cases in this category in which the precise number appears,
five were four-party cases,60 one was a five-party case,"' and two
5 Id. at 198 & n.5, 199; see infra note 87 and accompanying text.
51 H. BLACKSTONE, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE COURTS oF COM-
MON PLEAS AND EXCHEQUER CHAMBER (5th ed. London 1837) (1st ed. London 1791).
"These cases begin at 1 H. Bl. 97, 126 Eng. Rep. 58, and continue to 2 H. Bl. 16, 126
Eng. Rep. 404. Statistics are derived from these reported cases unless otherwise noted.
The number of parties usually appears in the caption of a case. E.g., Kirkman v.
Price, 1 H. B1. 309, 126 Eng. Rep. 182 (C.P. 1790) (two-party case); Hays & Another v.
Bryant, 1 H. Bl. 253, 126 Eng. Rep. 147 (C.P. 1789) (three-party case); Sumner v. Brady,
Cartwright & Fenton, 1 H. B1. 647, 126 Eng. Rep. 369 (C.P. 1791) (four-party case). Four-
party cases cannot always be distinguished from cases with more than four parties. E.g.,
Gunnis & Others v. Erhart, 1 H. B1. 289, 126 Eng. Rep. 169 (C.P. 1789). In some cases
involving more than four parties, the exact number of parties is revealed in the body of the
report; in others, however, the exact number cannot be determined.
"See supra note 58.
Sumner v. Brady, 1 H. B1. 647, 126 Eng. Rep. 369 (C.P. 1791); Arthington v. Bishop
of Chester, 1 H. BI. 418, 126 Eng. Rep. 243 (C.P. 1790); Collins v. Morgan, 1 H. Bi. 244, 126
Eng. Rep. 142 (C.P. 1789); Kilgour v. Finlyson, 1 H. Bl. 155, 126 Eng. Rep. 92 (C.P. 1789);
Rose v. Bowler, 1 H. Bl. 108, 126 Eng. Rep. 65 (C.P. 1789).
61 Barker v. Bishop of London, 1 H. Bl. 412, 126 Eng. Rep. 240 (C.P. 1790).
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were six-party cases.6 2 Moreover, virtually all of the multiple-party
suits involved joint liabilities or rights, which effectively reduced
them to the same level of party complexity as if the joint interests
were held by an individual: five cases involved partnerships, s six
involved co-indorsees or payees of a note or bond," five involved
groups of public officials e5 two involved sets of assignees in bank-
ruptcy,"6 four involved coparcenors of an advowson, 7 and one in-
volved a set of executors.68
2. Amounts in Controversy. Thirty-two percent of the re-
ported cases in Common Pleas indicate the amount in controversy.
The average amount in controversy was £ 1180 18s. 2/3d., but this
figure is distorted upward by a single action involving £ 17,600.69
The median amount in controversy was £ 396 18s.
3. The Forms of Action and the Nature of the Claims. Most
of the reported cases in Common Pleas consisted of relatively sim-
ple contract, real-property, and tort claims.70 The cases reported
by Blackstone in which the writ is revealed are summarized
below.71
' Thrale v. Bishop of London, 1 H. Bl. 530, 126 Eng. Rep. 304 (C.P. 1790); Thrale v.
Bishop of London, 1 H. B1. 376, 126 Eng. Rep. 221 (C.P. 1790).
'3 Clay v. Willan, 1 H. Bl. 298, 126 Eng. Rep. 174 (C.P. 1789); Gerard v. DeRobeck, 1 H.
B1. 280, 126 Eng. Rep. 164 (C.P. 1789); Collins v. Morgan, 1 H. BL 244, 126 Eng. Rep. 142
(C.P. 1789); Israel v. Douglas, 1 H. Bl. 239, 126 Eng. Rep. 139 (C.P. 1789); Kilgour v. Fin-
lyson, 1 H. BL. 155, 126 Eng. Rep. 92 (C.P. 1789).
" Davidson v. Lord Foley, 2 H. Bl. 12, 126 Eng. Rep. 401 (C.P. 1791); Sumner v. Brady,
1 H. BL 647, 126 Eng. Rep. 369 (C.P. 1791); Newman v. Faucitt, 1 H. BL. 631, 126 Eng. Rep.
360 (C.P. 1791); Sumner v. Brady, 1 H. BL. 630, 126 Eng. Rep. 359 (C.P. 1791); Collis v.
Emett, 1 H. Bl. 313, 126 Eng. Rep. 185 (C.P. 1790); Kilgour v. Finlyson, 1 H. BI. 155, 126
Eng. Rep. 92 (C.P. 1789).
'5 Newman v. Faucitt, 1 H. Bl. 631, 126 Eng. Rep. 360 (C.P. 1791); The King v. Baker,
1 H. Bl. 543, 126 Eng. Rep. 312 (C.P. 1791); Hays v. Bryant, 1 H. Bl. 253, 126 Eng. Rep. 147
(C.P. 1789); Collins v. Morgan, 1 H. Bl. 244, 126 Eng. Rep. 142 (C.P. 1789); Mayor of
London v. Mayor of Lenne Regis, 1 H. Bl. 206, 126 Eng. Rep. 119 (C.P. 1789).
Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. BL 665, 126 Eng. Rep. 379 (C.P. 1791); Gray v. Fowler, 1 H. Bl.
462, 126 Eng. Rep. 268 (C.P. 1790) (advisory verdict for case originating in chancery).
7Thrale v. Bishop of London, 1 H. Bl. 530, 126 Eng. Rep. 304 (C.P. 1790); Arthington
v. Bishop of Chester, 1 H. Bl. 418, 126 Eng. Rep. 243 (C.P. 1790); Barker v. Bishop of
London, 1 H. BI. 412, 126 Eng. Rep. 240 (C.P. 1790); Thrale v. Bishop of London, 1 H. BL
376, 126 Eng. Rep. 221 (C.P. 1790).
" Rose v. Bowle, 1 H. Bl. 108, 126 Eng. Rep. 65 (C.P. 1789).
" Hobson v. Campbell, 1 H. Bl. 245, 126 Eng. Rep. 142 (C.P. 1789).
7o This simplicity is the result of the narrow scope of the forms of action. See supra
notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
71 The table includes only 74 cases (64% of the trial-level Common Pleas cases) because
in many of the cases the reporter describes only the controversy over, and resolution of,
procedural issues; in these cases, the precise nature of the underlying writ cannot by ascer-
tained. See, e.g., Parquot v. Eling, 1 H. Bl. 106, 126 Eng. Rep. 64 (C.P. 1789). Many of the
cases in which the writ is unascertainable involve issues of bail of the defendant. See, e.g.,
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Table 2
Writ No. of Cases
assumpsit : 30 (40.5%)
debt : 17 (23.0%)
ejectment 7 (9.5%)
trespass 7 (9.5%)
quare impedit 4 (5.4%)
replevin 3 (4.1%)
trespass on the case 3 (4.1%)
covenant 2 (2.7%)
de essendo quietum de the-
olonio 1 (1.4%)
The most common type of assumpsit action was on a bill of
exchange.72 Disputes of this kind presented the jury with a simple
issue based on the documentary evidence of the actual bill, per-
haps supplemented by limited testimony.73 The writ of debt was
most typically used to secure payment on a bond.74 Debt was
rarely used to enforce parol contracts, because the trial of such an
action was still by compurgation 5 Debt on a bond was not tried
Hall v. Walker, 1 H. B1. 638, 126 Eng. Rep. 364 (C.P 1791).
7 Six cases were of this type: Harvey v. Richards, 1 H. BI. 644, 126 Eng. Rep. 368 (C.P.
1791); Brooks v. Rogers, 1 H. B1. 640, 126 Eng. Rep. 365 (C.P. 1791); Wittersham v. Lady
Carlisle, 1 H. B1. 631, 126 Eng. Rep. 360 (C.P. 1791); Andrews v. Blake, 1 H. Bl. 529, 126
Eng. Rep. 303 (C.P. 1790); Collis v. Emett, 1 H. Bl. 313, 126 Eng. Rep. 185 (C.P. 1790);
Kilgour v. Finlyson, 1 H. B1. 155, 126 Eng. Rep. 92 (C.P. 1789).
7 See, e.g., Kilgour v. Finlyson, 1 H. Bl. 155, 126 Eng. Rep. 92 (C.P. 1789). In Kilgour,
the plaintiff had obtained a verdict against three partners for approximately £ 304 on a bill
of exchange. The court granted a rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted,
as two of the defendants demonstrated that the partnership had been dissolved and that
Finlyson had issued the bill to cover the share of the partnership's debts he had personally
assumed.
7 Nine cases were of this type: Haynes v. Hare, 1 H. Bl. 659, 126 Eng. Rep. 376 (C.P.
1791); Sumner v. Brady, 1 H. Bl. 647, 126 Eng. Rep. 369 (C.P. 1791); Newman v. Fancitt, 1
H. Bl. 631, 126 Eng. Rep. 360 (C.P. 1791); Scott v. Whalley, 1 H. Bl. 297, 126 Eng. Rep. 174
(C.P. 1789); Duke of St. Albans v. Shore, 1 H. BI. 270, 126 Eng. Rep. 158 (C.P. 1789); Hays
v. Bryant, 1 H. Bl. 253, 126 Eng. Rep. 147 (C.P. 1789); Hobson v. Campbell, 1 H. Bl. 245,
126 Eng. Rep. 142 (C.P. 1789); Orr v. Churchill, 1 H. B1. 227, 126 Eng. Rep. 131 (C.P. 1789);
Folliott v. Ogden, 1 H. Bl. 123, 126 Eng. Rep. 75 (C.P. 1789). A bond was a signed instru-
ment under seal obligating the obligor to pay a sum of money. Simpson, The Penal Bond
with Conditional Defeasance, 82 L.Q. REv. 392, 393 (1965).
71 See J. BAKER, supra note 22, at 268-69. Trial by compurgation, otherwise known as
wager of law, was the common mode of trial of many of the older writs, such as debt and
detinue:
The party who was called upon to make his law had to find a number of people, twelve
or some other number fixed by the court according to circumstances, and then take a
solemn oath that he was innocent. His companions, or 'compurgators' as they were
called, then swore that the oath which he had taken was clean.
T. PLUCKNE r, supra note 24, at 115 (footnote omitted). Wager of law was not abolished
until 1833. Id. at 116.
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by compurgation; the plaintiff simply won if he produced a facially
valid bond, the only issue originally triable to a jury being whether
the defendant had in fact issued the written instrument."8 In time,
the practice arose of allowing a bond to be endorsed with a condi-
tion, and the performance of such a condition was triable by jury.7
Nevertheless, the pleadings in an action of debt were limited to a
single piece of evidence: what appeared on the bond itself.""
Of course, not all of the cases heard in Common Pleas were
simple assumpsit or debt actions. The unusual aspects of these
more intricate cases, however, generally called for determination
by the court of complex or controversial issues of law, which did
not involve the jury.79 Among the more involved disputes were the
quare impedit suits to settle controversies over an advowson, i.e.,
the right to fill a vacancy in a church position.8 0 These controver-
sies might require the jury to examine documentary evidence
stretching back over several centuries. One special verdict traced
the title to an advowson back over two hundred years to letters
patent granted by Edward VI in 1552.81 Nevertheless, since each
case could involve only a single advowson, the task of a jury was
not substantially more difficult than that of tracing the chain of
title to an individual piece of real property.
During the years 1789 to 1791, only the bankruptcy of Livesay
and Company presented a controversy that in number of parties
'" The general issue of "nil debet," or absence of the underlying debt, was not subject
to jury trial. See C. FIFooT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CON-
TRACT 231-33 (1949).
7 See generally Simpson, supra note 74.
7S Cf. Haynes v. Hare, 1 H. BI. 659, 126 Eng. Rep. 376 (C.P. 1791) (parol evidence of
redemption option on life annuity refused, as party allegedly agreeing to option was
deceased).
70 See, for example, Folliott v. Ogden, 1 H. Bl. 123, 126 Eng. Rep. 75 (C.P. 1789), where
the claims of two American loyalists whose property had been confiscated during the Ameri-
can Revolution were at issue. A determination of the status of their business transactions,
which began in 1769, required an analysis of the extent to which certain events during the
Revolution had affected those transactions. The Court gave judgment for plaintiff before the
matter came to trial, however, because the defendant's averment that a fund existed in New
Jersey to pay loyalists' debts that had been attainted by the state did not constitute a plea
of payment and was, therefore, an insufficient answer to a writ of debt.
SO E.g., Barker v. Bishop of London, 1 H. B. 412, 126 Eng. Rep. 240 (C.P. 1790); Thrale
v. Bishop of London, 1 H. BI. 376, 126 Eng. Rep. 221 (C.P. 1790). The writ derives its name
from its command to the defendant to show quare impedit, literally, "why he hinders," the
plaintiff in his possession of the advowson. Quare impedit largely supplanted the assize of
darrein presentment and the writ of right of advowson. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note
22, at 24-25.
SI Arthington v. Bishop of Chester, 1 H. B. 418, 419-20, 126 Eng. Rep. 243, 244 (C.P.
1790). The special verdict was probably drafted by the parties and not the jurors.
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and intricacy of financial consequences might at first glance appear
to approach the level of complexity of contemporary antitrust or
securities cases. During the course of a given year, Livesay and
Company often negotiated bills whose total value was as much as
one million pounds sterling.8 2 The firm made a practice of drawing
the bills payable to fictitious persons and then endorsing them in
the names of the fictitious persons over to the firm.83 The parties
liable on the bills, of course, asserted these fictitious endorsements
as a defense.8 4 Although a large number of bills of exchange were
involved, each bill had to be sued on in a separate action of as-
sumpsit.85 The courts thus resolved the disputes accompanying the
demise of the firm without presenting anything other than a sim-
ple, one-issue dispute to any single jury.86
B. The Court of King's Bench
For civil disputes, the jurisdiction of the Court of King's
Bench differed little from that of Common Pleas. At one time,
Common Pleas held a monopoly of jurisdiction over actions to de-
termine title to real property, but by the late eighteenth century
King's Bench, through the development of the action of ejectment,
had come to be the more common forum for trying possessory
rights in real property.8 7 King's Bench, on the other hand, had
once had the exclusive power to issue the prerogative writs,88 but
by the late eighteenth century the other common law courts had
completely eroded the exclusivity of the King's Bench's authority
8 J CHrrrY, BILLS OF EXCHANGE 58-59 (London 1799).
Collis v. Emett, 1 H. BI. 313, 314-15, 126 Eng. Rep. 185, 186 (C.P. 1790).
" Id. at 318-20, 126 Eng. Rep, at 188-89.
" Id. Further litigation arising from the demise of Livesay and Company appeared in
King's Bench. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
88 Other procedural devices, particularly the special verdict, were also used to prevent
the litigation in the Livesay bankruptcy from requiring the jury to pass on complex factual
issues. For example, in Collis v. Emett, 1 H. BI. 313, 126 Eng. Rep. 185 (C.P. 1790), the
plaintiff obtained judgment on a special verdict that found that the bill in question should
be treated as if it had been made payable to the bearer. Id. at 321, 126 Eng. Rep. at 190. For
a discussion of special juries, see Devlin, supra note 3, at 80-83; Oldham, The Origins of the
Special Jury, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 137 (1983).
87 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 4-23.
- 1 id. at 226, 230-31. The prerogative, or "extraordinary," writs, which included man-
damus, non procedendo rege inconsulto, scire facias, ne exeat regno, prohibition, quo war-
ranto, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, and certiorari, were administrative orders issued
through the exercise of the extraordinary power of the king on a showing of proper cause.
See de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, 11 CAMBRDGE L.J. 40 (1951); Jenks, The Prerogative
Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523 (1923).
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and routinely issued these writs.8 9
The Term Reports of Charles Durnford and Edward Hyde
East, which cover the civil jurisdiction of King's Bench from 1785
to 1800, report 362 cases for the period from 1789 to 1791.90 These
cases include twenty-four criminal informations or indictments,
fifteen writs of mandamus, fifty-eight appeals from quarter ses-
sions, thirteen informations in the nature of a quo warranto, six
writs of error, and four writs of prohibition; the remaining 242
cases were suits amenable to civil jury trial. Because they required
a jury, the thirteen quo warranto cases91 have been added to the
civil jury cases for statistical purposes. A survey of these 255 cases
reveals a pattern strikingly similar to that of Common Pleas.
1. Parties. The tabulation of the number of parties is as
follows: 92
Table 3
No. of Parties No. of Cases
2 170 (67.2%)
3 44 (17.4%)
4 or more 39 (15.4%)
The typical case in King's Bench, as in Common Pleas, in-
volved a single plaintiff suing a single defendant. In only seven
percent of the cases were multiple parties present on both sides.93
89 See 5 G. JACOB, supra note 30, at 317; 1 W. TDD, supra note 25, at 36.
90 These cases appear at 3 T.R. 1 to 4 T.R. 496, 100 Eng. Rep. 423-1139. See C.
DURNFORD & E. EAST, TERM REPORTS IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH (London 1817).
Durnford and East were the first reporters to publish their reports promptly after the deci-
sions of the cases. Previous reports consisted of lawyer's notes, collected and published
many years after the decisions were rendered. 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 116.
Campbell included Durnford and East among the "very best law reporters that have ever
appeared in England." 2 J. CAMPBELL, THE LIVEs OF THE CHImF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 405
(Boston 1850).
" Although technically a criminal trial, the information in the nature of a quo warranto
was used to try a civil right between parties. This action was
properly a criminal method of prosecution, as well to punish the usurper by a fine for
the usurpation of [a franchise or liberty against the King], as to oust him, or seize it for
the Crown: but hath long been applied to the mere purposes of trying the civil right,
seizing the franchise, or ousting the wrongful possessor; the fine being nominal only.
5 G. JACOB, supra note 30, at 373 (citation omitted).
9' Two of the cases were conducted ex parte and, therefore, are not considered in the
tabulation. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing the methods used in
determining the number of parties).
93 The largest number of parties specifically reported in any of the King's Bench cases
is twenty-six. In that case, Doe v. Perkins, 3 T.R. 749, 100 Eng. Rep. 838 (K.B. 1790), two
lessors sought to eject twenty-four tenants. Because the defendants admitted the plaintiffs'
title and only contested the date on which they should have received notice to quit, the case
itself was routine and uncomplicated. See id. at 751, 100 Eng. Rep. at 839.
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In most of the cases with four or more parties, the relationships of
the parties, as in Common Pleas," were joint rights or liabilities
created by operation of law: thirteen cases involved assignees in
bankruptcy,95 three involved groups of public officials,98 and three
involved set of executors.97
2. Amounts in Controversy. Twenty-nine percent of the re-
ports of King's Bench cases indicate the amount in controversy.
The mean is approximately £ 1,760, but the median amount is only
£ 200. The mean is skewed upwards by one case where the amount
in controversy was £ 60,000.98 This figure is almost twicethe sum
of the amounts mentioned in all the other cases taken together.
Omitting this sum, the mean amount in controversy is £ 915.
3. The Forms of Action and the Nature of the Claims. Most
cases in King's Bench were, like those in Common Pleas, routine
common law contract or real property actions. The following chart
provides a breakdown of the cases:
See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
9 "Smith v. Hodson, 4 T.R. 211, 100 Eng. Rep. 979 (K.B. 1791); Hunter v. Potts, 4 T.R.
182, 100 Eng. Rep. 962 (K.B. 1791); Polleston v. Smith, 4 T.R. 161, 100 Eng. Rep. 950 (K.B.
1791); Kinloch v. Craig, 3 T.R. 783, 100 Eng. Rep 858 (K.B. 1790); Streatfield v. Halliday, 3
T.R. 779, 100 Eng. Rep. 855 (K.B. 1790); Utterson v. Vernon, 3 T.R. 539, 100 Eng. Rep. 721
(K.B. 1790); Hankey v. Smith, 3 T.R. 507, 100 Eng. Rep. 703 (K.B. 1789); Ellis v. Hunt, 3
T.R. 464, 100 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B. 1789); Hancock v. Entwisle, 3 T.R. 435, 100 Eng. Rep. 663
(K.B. 1789); Hancock v. Haywood, 3 T.R. 433, 100 Eng. Rep. 661 (K.B. 1789); Rollestson v.
Hibbert, 3 T.R. 406, 100 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1789); Collins v. Forbes, 3 T.R. 316, 100 Eng.
Rep. 596 (K.B. 1789); Nerot v. Wallace, 3 T.R. 17, 100 Eng. Rep. 432 (K.B. 1789).
"The King v. Shepherd, 4 T.R. 381, 100 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1791) (information in
nature of quo warranto against churchwardens); Noble v. Durell, 3 T.R. 271, 100 Eng. Rep.
569 (K.B. 1789) (frankpledge jury); Clark v. King, 3 T.R. 147, 100 Eng. Rep. 502 (K.B. 1789)
(bailiffs).
'" Doe v. Woodhouse, 4 T.R. 89, 100 Eng. Rep. 910 (K.B. 1790); Erving v. Peters, 3 T.R.
685, 100 Eng. Rep. 803 (K.B. 1790); Duffield v. Scott, 3 T.R. 374, 100 Eng. Rep. 628 (K.B.
1789).
" Petrie v. Benfield, 3 T.R. 476, 100 Eng. Rep. 686 (K.B. 1789). This case, for penalties
under the Bribery Act, 2 Geo. 2, c. 24, was allowed to proceed on a copy of the bill made by
the plaintiff. The original had been stolen from the file, presumably in an effort to frustrate
litigation because of the large amount in controversy.
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Table 4






quo warranto 13 (5.1%)




issues from Chancery 4 (1.6%)
miscellaneous 6 (2.3%)
procedural dispute where un-
derlying writ not identifiable 57 (22.3%)
Ordinary contract disputes formed the principal part of the
court's business, as the figures for assumpsit, debt, and covenant
demonstrate. Approximately one-half of the writs of debt, however,
involved statutory causes of action by common informers to re-
cover statutorily imposed penalties. These qui tam actions 9 were
two-party disputes involving rather minor penalties.100
The restrictive effects of the writ system on the cases found in
the Common Pleas reports is also present in King's Bench. For ex-
ample, in Hancock v. Haywood,10 1 Hancock and others were the
assignees of both Lomas and Edensor. Haywood was in debt to Lo-
mas separately, to Edensor separately, and to Lomas and Edensor
jointly. Hancock and the other plaintiffs recovered a verdict in as-
sumpsit on all three debts, but the court arrested judgment on the
separate debts, holding that only the joint debt could properly be
sued on in a single action.102 Similarly, in Ward v. Macauley,103 the
court set aside the verdict and nonsuited the plaintiff on the
grounds that only an action in trover would lie to recover goods
that were not in plaintiff's possession when taken. And in Smith v.
Hodson,'0 4 the court, finding that the plaintiff-assignees in bank-
" The name is derived from the phrase "qui tam pro domino rege, quam pro se ipso,
sequitur": who as well for our lord the king, as for himself, sues. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 28, at *160; 2 W. Jowrrr, DCTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 1463 (1959).
100 See, e.g., Shipman v. Henbest, 4 T.R. 109, 100 Eng. Rep. 921 (K.B. 1790) (illicit sale
of leather); Brooke v. Milliken, 3 T.R. 509, 100 Eng. Rep. 705 (K.B. 1789) (illicit sale of
imported reprints of books originally written and published in United Kingdom).
101 3 T.R. 433, 100 Eng. Rep. 661 (K.B. 1789).
102 Id. at 435, 100 Eng. Rep. at 663.
1o3 4 T.R. 489, 100 Eng. Rep. 1135 (K.B. 1791).
1" 4 T.R. 211, 100 Eng. Rep. 979 (K.B. 1791).
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ruptcy should have brought an action in trover to recover a prefer-
ence by the bankrupt on the eve of bankruptcy, set aside a verdict
for the plaintiffs in assumpsit and entered a nonsuit.
In relative terms, the most complex disputes in King's Bench
were those involving ejectment. Forty-three percent of the eject-
ment cases involved four or more parties; the same number of par-
ties were found in only thirteen percent of the remaining cases.
Moreover, resolution of ejectment disputes could call for an exami-
nation of evidence of a chain of title that spanned many years, and
the rules governing estates in real property were hardly a model of
clarity or simplicity. Nonetheless, the law of estates guaranteed
that the factfinder would have only a limited number of possibili-
ties to consider, and most of the evidence of title was preserved in
writing. In the final analysis, it is difficult to characterize ejectment
actions as other than fairly straightforward and routine.
C. Nisi Prius
Nisi prius was not a separate court; rather, it was the trial
phase of all common law courts. °5 When sitting at Westminster,
the justices would hear pleadings and post-trial motions. Between
terms, they would travel to the individual counties where the dis-
putes would be put to juries. 08 Ordinarily, the justices presided
over trials from all of the common law courts,10 7 but the reports
available for this period only include cases from the Court of
King's Bench.
The nisi prius cases are considered separately from the King's
Bench cases at Westminster for two reasons. First, the nisi prius
reports provide more direct information about the actual function-
ing of the jury. Second, the substantial similarity to the results ob-
served in the Westminster cases internally validates these results
and thus strengthens the inference that can be drawn as to the
limited and routine functions of the jury in common law disputes.
Thomas Peake's nisi prius reports, which are considered high-
15 The writ [of nisi prius] was so called because it ordered the sheriff to cause jurors,
summoned to be present at actions put down for trial in the central courts, to come to
Westminster before a named day 'unless before' the circuit justices should visit his
county. In fact the justices always came before the day.
R. PUGH, ITINERANT JUSTICES IN ENGLISH HISTORY 9 n.1 (1967); see 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 28, at *59.
101 See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 278-79, 283; T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 24,
at 165-67.
107 See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 281.
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ly accurate,108 cover the period from 1790 to 1812.109 Peake re-
ported eighty-five cases between 1790 and 1791,110 of which seven
were criminal cases. The remaining seventy-eight cases were before
a civil jury.
1. Parties. The statistics on parties derived from the nisi prius
reports indicate that the nisi prius cases were even simpler than
those found in the King's Bench reports:
Table 5
No. of Parties No. of Cases
2 59 (75.6%)
3 7 (9.0%)
4 or more 12 (15.4%)
Multiple parties were present on both sides of the dispute in
only three cases."' The multiple-party cases, as in the Common
Pleas and King's Bench cases, usually involved individuals related
through participation in a single legal entity, such as a partnership,
and thus presented cases differing little from ordinary two-party
disputes. Of the twelve actions involving four or more parties, four
involved assignees in bankruptcy,112 five involved partnerships,'
and one involved a group of nightwatchmen. 11 4 One of the two re-
maining cases was sent from Chancery for an advisory verdict on
the question "whether the plaintiff was the lawful issue of Charles
Standen."11 5
108 See 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 109-10; 2 J. WALLACE, THE REPORTERS
ARRANGED AND CHARACTERIZED WITH INCIDENTAL REMARKS 541 n.1 (4th ed. 1882).
109 T. PEAKE, supra note 49.
110 These cases appear at Peake 1, 170 Eng. Rep. 57, to Peake 142, 170 Eng. Rep. 108.
" Dawe v. Holdsworth, Peake 89, 170 Eng. Rep. 89 (K.B. 1791); Gorham v. Thompson,
Peake 60, 170 Eng. Rep. 78 (K.B. 1791); Licet v. Reid, Peake 49, 170 Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B.
1791).
"2 Dawe v. Holdsworth, Peake 89, 170 Eng. Rep. 89 (K.B. 1791); Henbest v. Brown,
Peake 75, 170 Eng. Rep. 84 (K.B. 1791); Licet v. Reid, Peake 49, 170 Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B.
1791); Robert v. Teasdale, Peake 38, 170 Eng. Rep. 71 (K.B. 1790).
'13 Rotheroe v. Elton, Peake 117, 170 Eng. Rep. 99 (K.B. 1791); White v. Boulton,
Peake 113, 170 Eng. Rep. 98 (K.B. 1791); Williams v. Dyde, Peake 99, 170 Eng. Rep. 93
(K.B. 1791); Barber v. Blackhouse, Peake 86, 170 Eng. Rep. 85 (K.B. 1791); Gorham v.
Thompson, Peake 60, 170 Eng. Rep. 78 (K.B. 1791).
14 White v. Edmunds, Peake 123, 170 Eng. Rep. 101 (K.B. 1791). The action was tres-
pass for assault and false imprisonment. The defendants successfully justified the imprison-
ment on the ground that they were watchmen conveying one Weeks to the watch-house and
that they had apprehended the plaintiff when he attempted to interfere with the arrest of
Weeks.
"I' Standen v. Standen, Peake 45, 170 Eng. Rep. 73 (K.B. 1791). The case turned upon
whether the banns had been published the requisite three times before Charles Standen
married the plaintiff's mother. The plaintiff's legitimacy would entitle him to a certain be-
quest "to the legitimate children of Charles Standen." Id. The case is also interesting for the
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2. Amount in Controversy. Amounts in controversy appear in
seventeen percent of the cases. The median amount was £ 50 and
the mean was £ 165. The sums are substantially lower than those
found in King's Bench.116
3. The Forms of Action and the Nature of the Claims. The
seventy-eight cases in the nisi prius reports break down as follows:
Table 6





trespass of the case 3 (3.8%)
ejectment 2 (2.6%)
covenant 1 (1.3%)
writ not identifiable 5 (6.4%)
Although the ejectment figures are lower,117 on the whole the
basic pattern of litigation shown in the nisi prius reports is much
the same as that at King's Bench:118 a majority of simple contract
actions, mostly assumpsit on a bill of exchange or for goods sold
and delivered, followed in frequency by real property and tort
disputes.
The typical assumpsit action in the nisi prius reports demon-
strates the extent to which the law of evidence restricted the com-
plexity of jury trials. In Kennet v. Greenwollers, 9 for example,
the assignees of a bankrupt sued the defendant for money had and
received. The court refused to allow the bankrupt to testify be-
cause he was interested in the outcome of the litigation.120 Other
cases show that the court, presuming the jury to be illiterate,
might exclude much of the documentary evidence as well. 21
freedom with which the trial judge commented on the evidence to the jury. Id. at 47-48, 170
Eng. Rep. at 74.
226 See supra text accompanying note 98.
117 Nine percent of the King's Bench actions were for ejectment, see supra Table 4,
while ejectment actions accounted for only 2.6% of the nisi-prius cases.
11 See supra text preceding note 99.
Peake 3, 170 Eng. Rep. 58 (K.B. 1790).
120 The plaintiffs, therefore, "not having any other evidence were nonsuited." Id. at 4,
170 Eng. Rep. at 58.
,22 In Macferson v. Thoytes, Peake 29, 170 Eng. Rep. 67 (K.B. 1790), the plaintiff
sought to prove the handwriting of the first endorser on a bill of exchange by showing the
jury an admitted sample of the endorser's handwriting for comparison. Lord Kenyon re-
fused to accept the evidence, concluding that the "[c]omparison of hands is no evidence. If
it were so, the situation of a Jury who could neither write nor read would be a strange one,
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The questions submitted to juries arose for the most part from
straightforward two-party transactions. Typical were issues such as
whether the defendant had in fact promised to pay an old debt
that had been discharged by bankruptcy,12 2 whether the defendant
owed rent quarterly or semi-annually,12 3 whether the defendant
could forego payment for medicine because of improper treat-
ment,1 24 whether the defendant had tendered funds sufficient to
cover excess expenses incurred under a contract to build a
house, 125 and whether payment of a bill of exchange had been con-
ditioned on the receipt by the defendant of a certain sum from a
third party.1 26
Among these cases, Thorton v. Royal Exchange Assurance
Co.1 27 involved perhaps the most complex evidentiary situation
presented to a jury. The defendant insurer refused to compensate
the plaintiff for a shipwreck, on the ground that the ship had not
been seaworthy when the insurance policy was issued. The court
permitted an expert shipbuilder to testify as to the ship's seawor-
thiness based on his reading of a written report of an inspection of
the ship conducted by other experts at the site of the accident.
Because of the contract issues, documentary evidence, and use of
expert testimony, this was an unusually complicated case for the
period in question. By comparison to modern litigation, however, it
seems remarkably routine.
D. Equity
As the previous discussion has indicated, "Suits at common
law" as conducted at the time of the adoption of the seventh
amendment possessed an inherent simplicity. Yet this observation
would be of little value in determining the nature of the civil-jury
guarantee if suits in equity were as straightforward as those at
common law. As the following examination of equity litigation in
England during the period of 1789 to 1791 demonstrates, however,
for it is impossible for such a Jury to compare the hand-writing." Id., 170 Eng. Rep. at 68.
M Williams v. Dyde, Peake 99, 170 Eng. Rep. 93 (K.B. 1791).
121 Carter v. Pryke, Peake 130, 170 Eng. Rep. 104 (K.B. 1791).
124 Kannen v. M'Mullen, Peake 83, 170 Eng. Rep. 87 (K.B. 1791).
135 Pepper v. Burland, Peake 139, 170 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1791).
12 Phetheon v. Whitmore, Peake 55, 170 Eng. Rep. 77 (K.B. 1791).
117 Peake 37, 170 Eng. Rep. 70 (K.B. 1790). Disputes arising out of the bankruptcy of
Livesay and Company, another relatively complex case, discussed supra notes 82-86 and
accompanying text, also appeared in King's Bench. See Minet v. Gibson, 3 T.R. 481, 100
Eng. Rep. 689 (K.B. 1789); Vere v. Lewis, 3 T.R. 182, 100 Eng. Rep. 522 (K.B. 1789);
Tatlock v. Harris, 3 T.R. 174, 100 Eng. Rep. 517 (K.B. 1789).
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cases in equity were decidedly more complex.
The Chancery was the principal court of equity in England in
1791.128 The Lord Chancellor was the sole judge of the court, and,
as the King's chief judicial officer, he exercised jurisdiction to cor-
rect the "inequities" of the common law.129 Although there were
certain established categories of equity jurisdiction,130 suits in
Chancery were not limited by any procedural system similar to the
writ system. Litigation proceeded entirely by document: suit was
initiated by a bill, the defendant gave a written answer, and all the
evidence was given by deposition. 31 According to Blackstone:
[A] commission out of chancery. . . for examining witnesses
in one cause will frequently last as long, and of course be full
as expensive, as the trial of a hundred issues at nisi prius: and
yet the fact cannot be determined by such commissioners at
all; no, not till the depositions are published and read at the
hearing of the cause in court.82
1. Parties. Between 1789 and 1791, William Brown reported
226 Chancery decisions.183 Unlike the cases brought in the common
law courts, multiple-party suits were the norm. In 52 of the 226
reported cases, the number of parties cannot be determined. The
remaining cases fall into the following distribution:
Table 7
No. of Parties No. of Cases
2 32 (18.4%)
3 12 (6.9%)
4 or more 113 (64.9%)
ex parte 17 (9.8%)
The category of four or more parties is by far the largest, a
marked contrast to the cases in the common law courts.'" Usually
11 See J. BAKER, supra note 22, at 86-89; see also 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at
395-445 (development of Court of Chancery). Compare 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at
*49, with id. at *43. In addition to the equity jurisdiction, there was an older administrative
side of the Chancery that issued the writs necessary for the initiation of suits at common
law. See 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 397-99.
129 See J. BAKER, supra note 22, at 87-88; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 22, at 453-59.
130 See J. BAKER, supra note 22, at 93-95; 1 W. HOLDSWORTE, supra note 22, at 467-69;
T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 24, at 692.
"I Devlin, supra note 12, at 58-59.
132 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *378-79.
133W. BROWN, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED. AND DETERMINED IN THE HIGH COURT OF
CHANCERY (5th ed. London 1820) (1st ed. London 1785). The relevant cases appear at 2 Bro.
C.C. 490 to 3 Bro. C.C. 415, 29 Eng. Rep. 269-618.
I See supra Table 1 (19.0% in Common Pleas); Table 3 (15.4% in King's Bench);
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the exact number of parties cannot be determined, because the re-
ports refer to multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants without
identifying the specific parties, although the reporter does occa-
sionally list all parties and explain their relationships to one an-
other in the body of his report.135 These relationships tended to be
considerably more complex than those in the cases in common law
courts.
136
The ex parte petitions were usually requests for admission as
a creditor in bankruptcy proceedings and as such were preliminary
to multiple-party litigation.13 7 Of the two-party cases, seventeen
involved parties to actions at law seeking equitable relief not avail-
able in the common law courts, such as discovery"8 or an injunc-
tion to stay trial at law.1 9 Other two-party cases were decidedly
more intricate than those in the law courts. For example, Countess
Dowager of Shrewsbury v. Earl of Shrewsbury14 0 involved a mar-
riage settlement, regulated by a private act of Parliament, in which
approximately £ 20,000 was in dispute.
2. Amount in Controversy. The amounts in controversy in the
Chancery cases were of a different order of magnitude from those
in the common law courts. The forty-four percent of the cases that
mention the amount in controversy reveal the following
distribution:
Table 5 (15.4% at nisi prius).
M' Where the parties are not listed, enough information is sometimes given about them
in the body of the report to indicate the complexity of the suit. See, e.g., Attorney General
v. Mayor of London, 3 Bro. C.C. 170, 29 Eng. Rep. 472 (Ch. 1790). In that case, testator had
established a trust in 1691 for the advancement of Christianity among the infidels in New
England and Virginia. Trustees were the Bishop of London, Earl of Burlington, President of
Trinity College, and Mayor of London. They could find no more infidels in those lands and
were also uncertain about the effect of the Revolution on an English trust with objects in
America. Besides the trustees, defendants included potential beneficiaries, such as the Col-
lege of William and Mary and the President and Fellows of Harvard College.
136 E.g., Butler v. Stratton, 3 Bro. C.C. 366, 29 Eng. Rep. 587 (Ch. 1791) (28 descend-
ants of testatrix involved in a dispute over a legacy of London real estate).
137 E.g., Ex parte Clarke in re Livesay & Co., 3 Bro. C.C. 238, 29 Eng. Rep. 511 (Ch.
1791). For a discussion of the Livesay and Company litigation, see supra notes 82-86 and
accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Rondeau v. Wyatt, 3 Bro. C.C. 154, 29 Eng. Rep. 462 (Ch. 1790).
11 See, e.g., Codd v. Woden, 3 Bro. C.C. 72, 29 Eng. Rep. 415 (Ch. 1790); Goate v.
Fryer, 3 Bro. C.C. 22, 29 Eng. Rep. 386 (Ch. 1789).
140 3 Bro. C.C. 120, 29 Eng. Rep. 445 (Ch. 1790).
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Table 8
Amounts No. of Cases
0 to £ 99 3 (3.0%)
£ 100 to £ 999 34 (34.3%)
£ 1,000 to £ 9,999 46 (46.5%)
£ 10,000 and greater 16 (16.2%)
The mean amount was approximately £ 4116. The median
amount was £ 1541. These figures are considerably larger than the
comparable amounts in the common law courts.1"'
3. The Nature of the Claims. As a general matter, the equity
cases demonstrate a complexity and variability far beyond that ev-
idenced in the common law courts. The most important factor
tending to complicate equity cases was the existence of procedural
devices unavailable at common law, such as interpleader 142 and
cross bills.143 In addition, cases often lasted many years. In
Samuda v. Furtado,14 4 for example, the original bill was filed in
1734, more than fifty-five years prior to the reported proceedings;
the suit had been abated by the deaths of parties and been revived
several times during the intervening years.
Ill. ANALYsIs
The paradox presented by the seventh amendment is how to
give meaning to the command to "preserve" the jury right in
"Suits at common law" in the context of modern litigation. Most of
the procedural incidents of common law civil trials in 1791 have
been abandoned. 145 The forms of action have been replaced in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by a unitary civil action, applica-
ble not only to the suits at law formerly governed by the writ sys-
tem but also to proceedings in equity.14 6 Joinder of claims has been
extended to all claims one party may have against another
whatever the nature of the claim,147 and joinder of parties has been
substantially expanded. 48 The technical requirement of pleading
141 See supra text following notes 68 (in Common Pleas: £ 396 18s. median, £ 1180 18s.
2/3d. mean), 97 (in King's Bench: £ 200 median, £ 1760 mean) & 115 (at nisi prius: £ 50
median, £ 165 mean).
142 See, e.g., Dungey v. Angove, 3 Bro. C.C. 36, 29 Eng. Rep. 393 (Ch. 1789).
143 See, e.g., Seton v. Seton, 2 Bro. C.C. 610, 29 Eng. Rep. 336 (Ch. 1789).
144 3 Bro. C.C. 70, 29 Eng. Rep. 413 (Ch. 1790).
14 See infra notes 146-57 and accompanying text.
146 FED. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as a 'civil ac-
tion.' "); see 2 J. MooRE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 2.01-2.06 (2d ed. 1984).
147 FED R. Civ. P. 18(a).
145 FED. R. Civ. P. 19-23, 24-25; see 3A J. MooRE & J. LUCAS, MooRE's FEDERAn PRAc-
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down to a single issue has been abolished,14e and, indeed, a party
may now plead in the alternative or inconsistently. 50 The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure also allow many of the procedural devices
formerly available only in equity, 15 such as interpleader, 152 cross
claims, ' and class actions,5 in jury trials. Under the Federal
Rules, the discovery process of the equity courts has essentially
been made available in all civil actions. 55 Furthermore, many of
the evidentiary restrictions that existed in 1791 have been elimi-
nated, such as disqualification of interested parties. 5  These
changes in the character of civil litigation are exacerbated by the
modern proliferation of novel statutory causes of action. 5 7
Of course, not all of the modern developments have expanded
the role of the jury. The judicial system has also created proce-
dural devices, such as nonmutual collateral estoppel, 58 directed
verdicts, 59 summary judgments,6 0 the power to set aside verdicts
TICE 1119.01-1[1] (2d ed. 1984) (history of rule 19), 20.03 (prior English permissive joinder
practice), 20.04 (prior American permissive joinder practice), 21.0311] (discussing wholesome
repudiation of common law misjoinder practice), 22.03 (former interpleader practice); 3B J.
MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE H 23.02[1] (2d ed. 1984) (development of
class action in equity), 24.03 (development of intervention practice).
149 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1).
180 Id. 8(e)(2).
151 For discussion of the limitation of cross claims and class actions to equity, see 3 J.
MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 13.34[2] (2d ed. 1984) (cross claim practice
prior to federal rules); 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.0112] &
nn.1-19 (2d ed. 1984) (development of the class action in English Chancery). A common law
writ of interpleader had existed, but interpleader was in fact always brought in equity. Com-
pare Z. CHAYEE, CASES ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES 1 (2d ed. 1939) (equitable interpleader su-
persedes legal interpleader because juries are unable to handle interpleader issues), with
Rogers, Historical Origins of Interpleader, 51 YALE L.J. 924, 932-47 (1942) (rise of equitable
interpleader caused by restriction of legal interpleader to defensive use).
,52 FED. R. Civ. P. 22; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1982) (interpleader stat-
utes). See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 10.21 (overview of interpleader);
3A J. MooRE & J. LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 7 22.02[2] (2d ed. 1984) (scope of
interpleader).
153 FED. R. Civ. P. 13; see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 10.14. Counterclaims
were not available in equity, but were a creation of the Field Code. Set-off, however, served
much the same purpose. See id. § 10.16.
'84 FED. R. Civ. P. 23; see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, § 10.18.
158 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. Compare 4 J. MooE & J. LucAs, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE % 26.0311] (2d ed. 1984) (former practice at law), with id. % 26.03[2] (former practice in
equity). A separate action in Chancery could sometimes be used to compel discovery for an
action at common law. See Devlin, supra note 3, at 54 (auxiliary equity); supra note 138 and
accompanying text.
'56 See FED. R. EVID. 601. See generally Bodansky, supra note 41 (discussion of aban-
donment of disqualification of interested parties).
'57 See supra note 8.
I See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333-37 (1979).
,5, See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-96 (1943).
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in part,161 and remittitur,6 2 in order to provide the court with a
means of checking jury abuse. These devices, however, serve prin-
cipally to check the discretion of the jury, not to reduce the num-
ber or complexity of the issues it must decide. 6
The survey presented in Part III of litigation in the common
law courts of England just prior to the ratification of the seventh
amendment highlights the degree to which the phrase "trial by
jury" would have called to the minds of the framers of the seventh
amendment the simplest and most straightforward of procedures.
The search for a complex-case exception to the seventh amend-
ment 6 that has engaged some authors is, therefore, misguided, be-
cause "complex" cases did not and could not occur in the common
law system to which the framers were accustomed. The remainder
of this Part explores the existing law on the scope of the seventh
amendment right to trial by jury and suggests that the current law
be modified to account for the effects of the pervasive procedural
changes in civil litigation since 1791.
A. Current Judicial Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment
The problem of determining what was meant by the command
to "preserve" the right to a jury trial in civil actions existed even
at the time the seventh amendment was adopted, because the new
republic had no uniform or long-standing tradition of its own from
which to draw.16 5 To fill this void the Supreme Court has, from its
earliest pronouncements, interpreted the seventh amendment as
calling for preservation of the jury right as it existed in the supe-
rior common law courts of England in 1791.166 The consequence of
this interpretation was the retention, for the limited purposes of
1,0 See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902).
,16 See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
162 See Dimick v. Schiedt, 283 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1935).
163 See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 6, §§ 7.12-7.22 (controlling the jury).
164 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
165 See Henderson, supra note 16, at 299-320; Wolfram, supra note 16, at 712-18.
166 In United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750), Justice
Story, sitting on circuit, stated that "[b]eyond all question, the common law... alluded to
[in the seventh amendment] is not the common law of any individual state, (for it probably
differs in all), but it is the common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurispru-
dence." Id. at 750. Story declined, however, to explain fully his reasoning for this conclusion:
"It cannot be necessary for me to expound the grounds of this opinion, because they must
be obvious to every person aquainted with the history of the law." Id. In a later Supreme
Court opinion, Story explained that "the phrase 'common law,'... is used in contradistinc-
tion to equity and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence." Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433,
446 (1830). The 1791 date was settled on in later cases. See, e.g., Baltimore & Carolina Line,
Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
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determining the scope of the jury right, of the dichotomy between
law and equity. If a plaintiff's claim would have been cognizable in
a 1791 English common law court, where juries were usually the
triers of fact, then he would be entitled to a jury trial.167 If, how-
ever, his claim could only have been brought in a court of equity,
where the chancellor alone was the trier of fact,6 8 then a jury trial
is not available in the federal courts.169
The application of this rule to simple real-property, tort, or
contract claims, for which forms of action existed in 1791, is rela-
tively straightforward. But the law did not stand still in 1791, and
new procedures and causes of action made a literal application of a
historical test for preserving the right to trial by jury inade-
quate.17 0 Justice Story, writing for the Court in Parsons v. Bed-
ford,1 71 concluded that as used in the seventh ammendment the
phrase "Suits at common law" meant,
not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its
old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights
were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to
those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equi-
table remedies were administered . . . . In a just sense, the
amendment then may well be construed to embrace all suits,
which are not of equity or admiralty jurisdiction, whatever
may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle
legal rights.172
This passage has been interpreted as adopting a "flexible" his-
torical approach to implementing the civil-jury guarantee. 1  This
167 For example, suits for damages under the antitrust laws are normally subject to jury
trial, because statutory causes of action for treble damages existed and were so tried in 1791.
See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959); see also supra note 5
(actions of debt for statutory penalties).
2" See Devlin, supra note 12, at 50, 58-59.
169 For example, proceedings in bankruptcy are not subject to jury trial even when they
involve disputed claims, because such proceedings have always been conducted in equity.
Katchen v. Landy, 392 U.S. 323, 336-37 (1966).
170 In fact, strict adherence to the procedural forms of England in 1791 would not have
been possible even at the time the amendment was adopted. Each of the English common
law courts, having developed from a different source at a different time, had procedures
somewhat different from each of the others. Thus, there was no one "common law proce-
dure" even in 1791, but rather a procedure of Common Pleas, a procedure of King's Bench,
and procedure of Exchequer. Even in 1791, an American court would have been unable to
find a single procedural system to which to refer.
171 28 U.S. 433 (1830).
172 Id. at 446.
173 See 5 J. MooRE, J. LucAs & J. WicKER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE I 38.11 (2d ed.
1982).
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approach permits the judiciary to adapt to the waning of the com-
mon law forms of action and their accompanying procedures.""
Under this approach, a court's primary focus in determining
whether there exists a right to jury trial in a given case is on the
nature of the rights and remedies at issue in the case, rather than
on the overall character of the entire proceeding.17 5 A court must
look beyond the procedural posture of the case and consider
whether the right at issue or the remedy requested is analogous to
a right or remedy found at common law in 1791.176 If there is a
sufficient resemblance, a jury trial is required.1 77 By adopting this
approach, the Supreme Court has allowed the development of pro-
cedural devices that did not exist in 1791 without circumventing
the right to civil jury trial.1 78 In short, one can say that the seventh
amendment is currently interpreted as intended to preserve "the
basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental ele-
ments, not the great mass of procedural forms and details, varying
even [in 1791] so widely among common-law jurisdictions."' 79
This framework seems wholly consonant with the spirit of the
seventh amendment. It is reasonable to assume that the framers
foresaw an evolution of the common law and did not intend for the
jury right to be lost as soon as any major judicial reform was im-
plemented. Neither the language of the amendment, nor the avail-
able legislative history, 80 however, supports the conclusion that
174 See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539 (1970) (legal claims in derivative suit
triable by jury even though "older procedures, now discarded" had prevented such suits);
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507 (1959) (adequacy of legal remedy must
be judged in light of remedies now available, not "discarded procedures").
175 See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970) (legal issues in derivative suit triable
to jury); Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963) (declaratory action for attorney's fees
triable to jury); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477 (1962) (claim for money judg-
ment triable to jury despite characterization as equitable accounting); Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959) (treble damage issues juriable despite presentation in
declaratory action).
178 See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
177 See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974) (District of Columbia
statutory right to recover possesson of real property resembles common law ejectment); Ross
v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539 (1970) (corporate claims identical whether sued upon directly
or derivatively).
178 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (nonmutual collateral estop-
pel); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (directed verdict); Gasoline Prods. Co.
v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931) (setting aside of verdict in part); Fidelity & De-
posit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902) (summary judgment).
178 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (quoting Galloway v. United
States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943)).
18O See Henderson, supra note 16, at 291-99 (legislative history appears to be silent on
this subject); Wolfram, supra note 16, passim (state ratifying conventions concerned with
need for, not limits on, civil jury trial).
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the framers intended that the focus of an inquiry into the limits of
the right to a civil jury be only on the "substantive" aspects of the
trial, that is, the rights asserted and the remedies sought, and
never on its procedural elements. Accepting that the seventh
amendment's explicit call for the "preservation" of rights existing
at the time of ratification implies that a historical perspective is
constitutionally required, 181 there still remains a question as to
whether, if one departs too far from the procedural aspects of jury
trials as they were conducted in 1791, one can still be said to be
preserving the right to jury trial.
As the survey and preceding discussion indicate, "complex"
cases, as we understand that term today, simply did not occur in
the common law system known to the framers. Insofar as analogies
based on complexity are appropriate, complex modern litigation
bears much closer resemblance to equitable actions in 1791, heard
without a jury, than to common law actions. Nonetheless, it would
probably also be incorrect to conclude from this fact alone that
modern complex litigation, such as one finds in actions brought
under the securities or antitrust laws, falls outside the protection
afforded the civil jury right by the seventh amendment.
The defect in the existing analysis of the seventh amendment
is that it pays too little attention to the enormous differences be-
tween civil litigation in 1791 and civil litigation today. The fram-
ers, schooled in the traditions of the British legal system, 182 were
undoubtedly aware of the restricted scope of actions at common
law, as well as the limited role of the jury. It seems likely that they
were also aware of the reasons for the narrow ambit of the common
law jury system. By "preserving" the distinctions between law and
equity, they tacitly acknowledged that the right to a jury trial
should not extend to those situations where the jury would be an
inappropriate fact-finding body.18 Their conception of a "Suit[] at
"' See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935) ("[T]he word 'jury' and the words
'trial by jury' were placed in the Constitution of the United States with reference to the
meaning affixed to them in the law as it was in this country and in England at the time of
the adoption of that instrument .. "), (citing Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350
(1898)).
21 See Henderson, supra note 16, at 299 (civil jury practice differed in each of the
thirteen colonies because each borrowed from a slightly different period of English practice);
see also L. FRnmN, A HISTORY OF AMRmcN LAw 29 (1973) (American law became more
English after Revolution than before); id. at 126-28 (use of English civil procedure); G. Gm-
MoRE, THE AGES OF AMmiEcm LAw 19 (1977) (use of English legal sources and education).
I" It is possible that the framers intended for the role of the jury in the legal system to
remain narrow. The amendment does not mandate that all factfinding be performed by a
jury. The language explicitly preserves the jury right only for "Suits at common law,"
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common law" must have embodied these notions as much as it em-
bodied notions about the types of rights cognizable and remedies
available in the common law courts. Under modern rules of plead-
ing and procedure, a case may be brought that bears so little re-
semblance to anything that could ever have occurred in the com-
mon law courts in 1791 that the difference between them is more
aptly called a difference in kind, rather than in degree. Submission
of such a case to a jury represents a repudiation, rather than an
application, of a historical test. One might as easily assert that a
jury is appropriate because the litigation is conducted in a court-
room that was in use in 1791.
In most cases, the current doctrine's focus on the "substan-
tive" aspects of the case, the remedies and rights, may be appro-
priate. It is, however, futile to assume that an unwavering line can
be drawn between substance and procedure."' More importantly,
it flies in the face of a claimed reliance on history185 to conclude
that, in an action involving, for example, over 100 parties con-
testing eighteen consolidated class actions, with cross claims so nu-
merous as to require a five-page chart merely to list them and a
trial expected to last two years and involve about 500 witnesses
and 24,000 documents, a jury is constitutionally required simply
because the plaintiffs seek money damages, a remedy traditionally
granted at law. 186 When one considers that the modern rules on
class actions, discovery, and joinder of parties and claims are all
derived primarily from equity,18 7 it is an abandonment, rather than
an application, of a historical view of the seventh amendment to
call such an action a "Suit[] at common law." Stated differently,
even if one accepts the Court's current focus on substantive rights
and remedies, there comes a point at which the changes in proce-
dure have been so extensive that there has been a change in the
thereby excluding juries from admiralty, maritime, and, most importantly, equity cases. See
United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750) (Story, J.).
18 Drawing such a line is especially difficult under a test that refers to the old common
law, dominated by the forms of action. As Maine so memorably said, "So great is the ascen-
dancy of the Law of Actions in the infancy of the Courts of Justice, that substantive law has
at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure ...." H. MAINE,
DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883); see F. MAITLAND, supra note 29, at 1-
2.
185 See supra notes 166, 181.
188 In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F. 2d 411 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). The figures for witnesses and documents are,
based on the trial judge's estimate that the defendants would present at least as much evi-
dence as the plaintiffs, who had announced their intention to call 241 witnesses and offer
nearly 12,000 documents, 75 F.R.D. at 707. See supra note 9.
187 See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
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substantive character of the action as well. When such a point is
reached, an effort to distinguish cases on the basis of the rights
asserted and the remedies sought seeks to preserve the right to a
jury trial in what can no longer in any realistic sense be called a
suit at common law.
The ultimate question is determining when that point has
been reached. As with other constitutional standards,188 a determi-
nation as to the availability of a jury trial should depend on a con-
sideration of the totality of circumstances in light of a number of
relevant factors. These include not only the nature of the rights
and remedies, but also the number of parties, the relations they
bear to one another, the complexity of the legal and factual issues,
the number of claims, and the amount and complexity of the evi-
dence that will be adduced to establish those claims. If the case is
so complex because of the combination of flexible procedure and
intricate substantive inquiries that, except for the remedy sought,
it bears no resemblance whatsoever to suits heard in the English
common law system, it is simply not an action for which the jury
right can be said to be "preserved."
CONCLUSION
The seventh amendment calls for the preservation of the right
to a jury trial in "Suits at common law." In implementing this con-
stitutional provision, the Supreme Court has developed a "flexible"
historical test that focuses primarily on the substantive aspects of
the litigation, namely the rights asserted and remedies sought.
This comment has argued for a reevaluation of the jury right under
the seventh amendment. Statistical analysis of litigation in the
common law and equity courts of England during the period of
1789 to 1791 demonstrates that, by comparison to the equity
courts, common law cases were very narrow in scope and, by virtue
of the existing procedural system, complex cases were not possible
at common law.
The implications for the seventh amendment are clear. The
jury the framers sought to preserve was an institution severely con-
strained by procedural limitations. The seventh amendment, of
course, does not command strict adherence to common law proce-
dure. Subsequent development of procedure was inevitable, and it
I" See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (factors to be considered in de-
termination of due process); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (pendent
jurisdiction); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent search under fourth
amendment).
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is unlikely that the framers intended for the jury right to be extin-
guished by every deviation in procedure. Nonetheless, procedural
context is not irrelevant. The effect of liberalizing the modern rules
of procedure so as to allow increasingly complex litigation has al-
tered the substantive character of civil disputes.
In applying the historical test mandated by the seventh
amendment, the courts should consider the overall character of the
litigation. If, in fact, the suit, because of the combination of proce-
dural and substantive complexity, is undoubtedly well beyond the
framers' understanding of "Suits at common law," no party should
have a right to demand a jury trial.
Douglas King
